Autonomic Vehicular Networks: Safety, Privacy, Cybersecurity and
  Societal Issues by Lann, Gérard Le
  
Autonomic Vehicular Networks: Safety, Privacy, 
Cybersecurity and Societal Issues  
Gerard Le Lann 
INRIA 
Paris-Rocquencourt, France 
gerard.le_lann@inria.fr
Abstract—Safety, efficiency, privacy, and cybersecurity can 
be achieved jointly in self-organizing networks of communicating 
vehicles of various automated driving levels. The underlying 
approach, solutions and novel results are briefly exposed. We 
explain why we are faced with a crucial choice regarding 
motorized society and cyber surveillance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular networks are bound to be autonomic, i.e. self-
organizing and self-healing. An autonomic vehicular network 
(AVN) is comprised of partially or fully automated vehicles, 
assigned SAE automated driving levels ranging from 0 to 5 [1]. 
The focus of this paper is on AVN constructs and vehicular 
capabilities meant to achieve the following four fundamental 
properties: safety (a significant reduction of severe injuries, 
fatalities, and damages), efficiency (high vehicular densities, 
good asphalt utilization ratios), privacy (no cyberespionage), 
and cybersecurity (immunity to cyberthreats). With current and 
upcoming standards such as, e.g., IEEE 802.11p, ETSI ITS-
G5, IEEE 1609-2 (MAC and channel management), SAE 
J2945/1-2.2, ETSI TS 102 637 (periodic beaconing), and ETSI 
TS 102 940 (security schemes based on PKIs (Public Key 
Infrastructures)), none of the aforementioned goals can be 
reached fully. Authors who have arrived at such conclusions 
have published proposals aimed at improving current solutions. 
However, intractable limitations remain. For example, current 
thinking is that one cannot have safety and privacy together. 
That is incorrect. Our intent here is to share a vision of how to 
meet the challenge of achieving safety, efficiency, privacy and 
cybersecurity jointly, by design. This vision may be considered 
unreasonably radical by a fraction of the ITS community. 
However, there is no choice: under current approaches, risks of 
cyber-surveillance and collisions due to cyberattacks are not 
eliminated fully. Along with other scientists and lawyers, we 
advocate for the adoption of novel approaches and solutions 
that would serve as foundations for the next “wave” of 
standards, denoted WAVE 2.0 for convenience, WAVE 1.0 
referring to current and upcoming standards.  
We have been here before. Remember the MAP initiative 
by General Motors, the IBM Token Ring saga, and other 
similar failures? Despite huge investments and financial losses, 
products based on the IEEE 802.4, 802.5, 802.6 (DQDB) 
standards, or FDDI networks, have disappeared soon after 
deployment. Whether this could be the fate of 802.11p is not 
our concern here. Rather, we anticipate the continuous 
emergence of novel communication technologies as well as the 
adoption of more rigorous approaches regarding the design of 
onboard systems and solutions for next-gen AVNs.   
Some recent results are presented in this paper. Due to 
space restrictions, they cannot be exposed thoroughly. Detailed 
presentations are to appear in forthcoming publications and 
research reports. We introduce partitioned architectures for 
onboard systems (Section II), vehicular cells (Section III), the 
trusted vehicular subnetwork construct, the spontaneous 
formation of homogeneous subnetworks of identical SAE 
automation levels (Section IV), PKI-free pseudonym schemes, 
privacy and safety in the presence of cyberthreats, physical 
exclusion of a malicious vehicle, and the cyber-stealth mode 
(Section V). Adopting or not adopting the WAVE 2.0 approach 
implies a fundamental societal choice of deep consequences 
regarding cyber-surveillance. 
II. PARTITIONED ONBOARD SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES 
AVNs are life-critical systems-of-systems. Conformance to 
design principles in force in every safety-critical (SC) domain 
(e.g., aerospace, chemical/nuclear plants) is thus mandatory, 
notably a strict separation of SC and non-SC functionalities. 
Fig. 1 shows a simple example of a partitioned onboard system 
architecture. A SC subsystem comprises a SCR subsystem 
(robotics and other capabilities, e.g., AI and algorithmic 
learning), and a SCC subsystem (short-range neighbor-to-
neighbor (N2N) and SC V2V radio communications, optical 
communications, time-bounded coordination algorithms). SC 
subsystems are equipped with specific processors and real-time 
operating systems, and they shall be ASIL-D compliant (ISO 
26262 standard). Besides its own inputs (radars, lidars, 
cameras), a SCR subsystem processes data written by a SCC 
subsystem in their shared memory. They share a UTC-aligned 
clock (GNSS inputs) and back-up clocks (to cope with GNSS 
outages) as well as a tamper-proof device (TPD) which records 
significant events, and may fire a Stop maneuver, to be 
performed by the SCR subsystem. A non-SC (NSC) subsystem 
hosts non safety-critical V2X (V2V/V2I) telecommunication 
capabilities (WAVE 1.0 standards, 4G LTE, 5G, 6G), most of 
them resting on terrestrial nodes for, e.g., infotainment, access 
to Internet, cloud services and to PKIs. A NSC subsystem 
cannot write in the SC subsystem data space. The NSC TPD 
can be updated via V2X telecommunications.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. A partitioned onboard system 
Terrestrial topology provided in emaps shows lanes and 
their numbering, starting from 1 for the rightmost lane 
(leftmost in certain countries). Numbers are assigned to roads 
at intersections and roundabouts. Knowledge of correct lane-
level positioning is achieved by SCR and SCC subsystems, 
e.g., via hybrid measurements [2] or visual SLAM. 
III. SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY 
A. Vehicular Cells and Safety-Critical Communications 
WAVE 1.0 radio ranges in the order of 300 m and reliance 
on V2I communications are inappropriate for safety. The 
vehicular cell concept derives from observing that vehicles 
may collide only if close to each other. Let Cell(X) stand for 
X’s vehicular cell. Assuming a multilane setting, highest traffic 
density and smallest vehicles size, maximal Cell(X) would 
comprise 14 members in addition to X (2 closest predecessors 
and successors and 5 neighbors in each lateral lane), as shown 
in Fig. 2. Neighbors that may hit X belong to Cell(X). In a Cell, 
collision prevention implies ultra-fast coordination. That is the 
purpose of N2N very short-range communications (up to 30 m 
approximately), activated only when needed (no beaconing), 
longitudinally (e.g., steep deceleration) or laterally (e.g., lane 
change, subject to distributed agreement). Anonymity is a 
fundamental feature of N2N messages: source and destination 
fields carry non-reversible names (no MAC or IP address)—
see Section IV. Vehicles that belong to different Cells shall be 
able to coordinate their behaviors. That is the purpose of short-
range SC V2V communications (up to 60 m approximately). 
For example, safe entrance to un-signaled intersections or 
roundabouts can be achieved by exchanging SC V2V messages 
among members of competing Cells. (Safe crossings would 
mostly rest on optical communications.) N2N and SC V2V 
messaging is performed via power-controlled omnidirectional, 
directional, or MIMO radio antennas that operate on channels 
distinct from those used for V2X telecommunications. With 
power control, radio ranges can be tuned as desired (up to ≈ 30 
m or ≈ 60 m). N2N and SC V2V communications serve to 
cope with failures of onboard sensors and to achieve proactive 
safety—the ability to influence the behaviors of nearby 
vehicles. Communications are not just yet another “sensing” 
technology. They supplement robotics and AI, able to achieve 
reactive safety only, since behavioral decisions are kept 
untold—others have to guess. Optics-based N2N messaging is 
an invaluable technology regarding privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Vehicular Cell and authenticated Join maneuvers 
V2X messages that are authenticated can be imported in a 
SCC subsystem for further processing (otherwise, a V2X 
message is kept inside a NSC subsystem). Privacy and 
cybersecurity issues related to V2X telecommunications differ 
from those arising with N2N and SC V2V communications. 
B. Restricted Spanning of N2N Communications 
Technologies change at a higher pace than requirements 
(our four properties). It is thus wiser to specify desired 
communication primitives, leaving open the choice of 
appropriate underlying technologies. This is consistent with the 
emergence of software-defined architectures and with our 
recommendation for top-down approaches. Four primitives are 
defined for N2N messaging. A LgSend primitive serves to 
trigger range 2 longitudinal communications: a N2N message 
sent by X shall reach X’s 2 closest predecessors and successors, 
if any. A LtSend primitive serves to trigger range 1 lateral 
communications: X shall be able to send N2N messages to its 
closest adjacent (left, right) neighbors, if any. Communications 
are transitive across Cells: N2N messages can be disseminated 
longitudinally and laterally. Symmetrically, we have defined 
the LgReceive and LtReceive primitives (see Section IV). 
Enforcing restricted spanning for N2N communications has 
decisive merits regarding cybersecurity.  
C. MAC Protocols 
 A MAC protocol shall match higher-level requirements. 
As for safety and efficiency, a MAC protocol shall guarantee 
small bounded channel access delays (λ) under highest channel 
contention conditions and small bounded delays for message 
dissemination under highest message loss conditions. A MAC 
protocol is acceptable only if distances travelled in λ are an 
order of magnitude smaller than inter-vehicular gaps. As for 
privacy and cybersecurity, a MAC protocol shall help in 
thwarting eavesdropping, masquerading, message forging, 
Sybil attacks, and the like. WAVE 1.0 MAC protocols fail to 
meet these requirements, by huge margins concerning λ [3-6]. 
Different MAC protocols are defined for N2N radio channels 
and for SC V2V radio channels. Suitable protocols can be 
found in the literature—e.g., [7-8].  
D. Periodic Beaconing Considered Useless for Safety 
Given that radio communications are unreliable, some 
vehicle(s) may not receive beacons delivered to others. 
Consequently, Local Dynamic Maps (LDMs) built out of 
non safety-critical and global functionalities
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periodic beaconing (Cooperative Awareness Messages) may 
differ significantly, which is a serious weakness regarding 
safety. Consider X, A and B moving at 90 km/h. X broadcasts 
beacons at 1 Hz. Consider the case where a given beacon 
received by A is not received by B. X’s geolocations recorded 
in LDM(A) and LDM(B) differ by 25 m, enough for creating 
collisions. Despite periodic updates, discrepancies may persist. 
Algorithms such as terminating atomic broadcast or consensus 
keep LDMs mutually consistent (identical in our case), under 
assumptions … that are not met in AVNs. In an asynchronous 
model (delays have unknown bounds—the case with WAVE), 
consensus is impossible in the presence of a single loss [9]. In a 
synchronous model (delays have known upper bounds), neither 
unanimity nor strong majority can be achieved when loss ratios 
exceed modest thresholds [10-11]. Since channel access delays 
differ for any 2 broadcasters, geolocations read in different 
beacons cannot mirror a correct instantaneous “picture” of 
some real global state. (This is a problem studied over the last 
30 years in the Distributed Algorithms community.) Being 
possibly inaccurate and mutually inconsistent, LDMs are 
useless for making safety-preserving decisions. Moreover, 
LDMs cannot help in avoiding accidents, since vehicle 
trajectories cannot be predicted with certainty from past 
trajectories. A LDM updated at UTC time t cannot reflect 
moves made by vehicles right after t, which moves may be 
dictated by unexpected hazards—besides depending on each 
other. Finally, why should a vehicle waste communication and 
computational resources to maintain knowledge relative to 
distant vehicles that it will never see? Periodic beaconing is 
just another passive solution that may help to achieve reactive 
safety probabilistically, when proactive safety is needed for 
collision prevention. In addition to being useless (and 
unreliable), periodic beaconing may be harmful. Beacons carry 
unencrypted GNSS data (in particular) that can be heard by 
distant unknown vehicles and terrestrial nodes, thus facilitating 
eavesdropping and tracking.  
IV. COHORTS 
Efficiency (very small inter-vehicular gaps) is antagonistic 
with safety. Both properties can nevertheless be reconciled. An 
AVN being an instance of a cyber-physical system, correct 
solutions for safety and efficiency must be based on some 
appropriate cyber-physical construct. A linear formation of 
vehicles in a given lane is commonly referred to as a platoon 
(long-lived formation) or as a string (short-lived ad hoc 
formation). In [12-13], we have presented and discussed the 
cohort construct, which is a linear formation endowed with a 
specification. In addition to small inter-vehicular gaps (iv-
gaps), safe inter-cohort gaps (IC-gaps) have been proposed, 
large enough for guaranteeing that the head of a cohort never 
hits the tail of a preceding cohort. The rationale is to keep the 
number of rear-end collisions below an acceptable threshold in 
case a “brick wall” condition would develop within a cohort. A 
spontaneous ranking of members is a crucial property of the 
cohort construct. An example of a similar idea can be found in 
[14]—concepts of convoy, authenticated members and vehicle 
sequence numbers. In a cohort, members assign themselves 
consecutive ranks, 1 for the head and n (an inverse function of 
velocity) for the tail. Highest velocities and cohort sizes depend 
on the setting (city streets, country roads, highways). Any 2 
contiguous members exchange N2N messages that carry SC 
data or data needed for internal cohort management (e.g., 
common knowledge of current n and velocity). Time-bounded 
broadcasts can be instantiated via cohort-wide N2N message 
dissemination [15]—unfeasible with WAVE 1.0 solutions. 
Details relative to reliability (losses of N2N messages, cohort 
splits performed when a N2N link is detected failed) can be 
found in referenced publications. Names that appear in N2N 
messages exchanged within a cohort circulating in lane 
numbered j are pairs of integers {r,j}, where r stands for 
sender’s rank. Longitudinal N2N messages processed by a 
member ranked rth are those received from neighbors of ranks 
r+1 and r+2, or/and r-1 and r-2 (the LgReceive primitive). As 
for lateral N2N messaging and LtReceive, designation of 
specific lateral neighbors without knowing their names is an 
issue. This problem has original solutions, based on optics [16-
17]. Human-less seeing-is-believing [17] fits ideally with the 
cohort construct (to appear). A vehicle that wants to become 
member of a cohort activates a LgJoin primitive (if catching up 
with the tail of a cohort) or a LtJoin primitive (in case of a lane 
change), based on LgSend and LtSend primitives (see Fig. 2).  
A novel result relates to the spontaneous formation of 
homogeneous cohorts. Let aul(V) stand for V’s automated 
driving level. Assume that vehicles reactivity and agility are 
higher with higher automation levels. With smaller iv-gaps and 
IC-gaps, efficiency is higher as well. A cohort (Γ) specification 
stipulates the smallest and highest automation levels accepted 
in Γ, denoted SL(Γ) and HL(Γ), respectively. (These levels may 
change dynamically, subject to cohort-wide agreement.) 
LgJoin and LtJoin primitives have aul(.) as a parameter. If 
SL(Γ) ≤ aul(V) ≤ HL(Γ) holds, then V is accepted in cohort Γ. 
A strictly homogeneous cohort Γ is spontaneously created by 
setting SL(Γ) = HL(Γ). There is no need for restricting the 
circulation of highly automated vehicles to specific lanes. In 
addition to being antagonistic with the efficiency property, 
such a constraint might be a source of frustration. In a 
multilane highway, other vehicles may enjoy fluid traffic 
conditions while congestion would develop in specific lanes. 
Vehicles assigned low automation levels may or may not be 
equipped with communication capabilities. In the former case, 
they would form inefficient cohorts (large iv-gaps). 
Inefficiency is highest in the latter case (human-driven 
vehicles), since we would have iv-gaps = IC-gaps. Another 
property of cohorts has been uncovered recently: a cohort is a 
trusted vehicular sub-network.  
V. PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY  
Originally devised for safety and efficiency, a cohort is 
essential also for privacy and cybersecurity. Note that issues of 
cyber-surveillance carried out by sensors installed inside 
vehicles (e.g., cameras) are out of the scope of this paper. 
A. Pseudonymity 
Solutions based on asymmetric cryptography, PKIs and 
pseudonymity [18] are being worked out by standard-making 
bodies. When registered and authenticated by a certification 
authority (CA), a vehicle is assigned a unique reversible 
certificate for accountability purposes (auditability, liability) as 
well as credentials, i.e. pairs {pseudonym, pseudonym 
certificate}, referred to as a (certified) pseudo here. Current 
  
solutions are not satisfactory [19-21]. For example, tracking is 
feasible despite frequent changes of pseudos. Major roadblocks 
can be eliminated as follows: no binding with beaconing, no 
dependence on PKIs (no importation of new pseudos). Why 
should a vehicle “prove” that it has been authenticated each 
time it sends a message? That is unnecessary if, as commonly 
assumed, most vehicles are not malicious. With vehicular 
networks that lack structuring constructs and that rely on V2X 
telecommunications, there might be no alternative. Pseudos are 
spent at high frequencies, and vehicles must replenish their 
TPDs with new credentials. As a result, an AVN is prone to 
man-in-the-middle (MitM) cyberattacks (e.g., suppression or 
falsification of pseudos) launched via intrusions of terrestrial 
nodes. Moreover, communication and computational resources 
are wasted. Consider ECDSA-256 signatures, a verification 
time of 2 ms, 7 Hz beaconing frequency, and a vehicle within 
WAVE 1.0 radio range (≈ 300 m) of x vehicles. Thrashing 
develops as x tends to 70, the case in numerous settings. There 
are better ways of using onboard resources. Finally, assuming 
that vehicles are always within reach of terrestrial nodes, that 
they enter mix-zones whenever necessary, and so on severely 
restricts the applicability of current solutions.  
B. Anonymity in Trusted Vehicular Subnetworks 
A cohort is a vehicular subnetwork where members can 
trust each other, provided that admission into a cohort is 
subject to verified authentication, as shown in Fig. 2. A pseudo 
must be used to sign a LgJoin or a LtJoin request. Owing to 
controlled admission, no pseudo need be used afterwards for 
N2N messaging. As a result, pseudos available in a SC-TPD 
are consumed at reasonable a rate. This removes the need for 
on-the-move TPD replenishment of new pseudos via PKIs. If 
required by administrative or contractual regulations, TPD 
replenishment would be performed at secured places (no V2I 
communications). Vehicle thefts (an issue with long-lived 
pseudos) can be prevented or combated very easily. Self-issued 
names {r,j} that appear in N2N messages are non-reversible. 
Full anonymity is thus guaranteed, and these names entail very 
negligible processing overhead. WAVE 2.0 solutions provide 
vehicles with a double obfuscation scheme (pseudos and names 
{r,j}), while meeting the accountability requirement. Another 
condition for intra-cohort trust is immediate detection of any 
malicious behavior (see Subsection E). 
C. Close Cyberthreats in Trusted Vehicular Subnetworks 
Owing to the LgReceive and LtReceive primitives (Section 
IV), close cyberthreats that target X may only be launched by 
members of Cell(X). That is a drastic change compared to 
traditional approaches where cyberthreats may be instigated by 
unknown distant vehicles and terrestrial nodes. Close 
eavesdropping is not an issue. N2N messages do not carry 
GNSS coordinates, thus geo-privacy is ensured. N2N messages 
carry unencrypted SC data such as “lane merging”, “clear lane” 
(emergency vehicle), “new v” (bad road conditions, lane 
blocking). Secrecy is not an issue. Vehicles nearby Cell(X) 
may overhear N2N messages exchanged by members of 
Cell(X) which start a SC maneuver. That can only be beneficial 
(think of concurrent conflicting maneuvers). As regards 
metadata, close tracking of a given name {r,j} is pointless, 
since the same name may be used by different vehicles at 
unpredictable different times. Assuming in the order of 5,000 
pseudos in a SC-TPD, none would be used more than once a 
day. Reuse is thus possible without being tracked. Close 
physical tracking/spying (a vehicle is followed by the same car 
for too long) is out of the scope of this paper.  
We have analyzed close cyberattacks such as, e.g., N2N 
message falsification, suppression, masquerading, Sybil attack, 
injection of false messages, and demonstrated that they cannot 
endanger safety in a Cell or defeat controlled admission in a 
cohort (to appear). Consequently, they can only originate from 
irrational neighbors. A honest vehicle may behave as an 
irrational adversary when its SCC subsystem has been 
contaminated by a malware, leading to those mitm (malware-
in-the-middle) cyberattacks mentioned above. A contaminated 
vehicle is quickly excluded (see Subsection E). It is customary 
to assume that an AVN comprises a minority of malicious 
vehicles. Assuming cohorts of size 3 at least (other cases not 
detailed here, for conciseness), this assumption can be stated 
more accurately: at most 1 malicious member in any group of 3 
longitudinal neighbors. Owing to the LgReceive primitive, 
forging or suppression of a longitudinal N2N message m sent 
by a range 2 neighbor and relayed by a range 1 neighbor is 
trivially detected: m is accepted only if seen twice. A lateral 
N2N message is accepted only if identical or consistent copies 
are received from at least 2 out of 3 neighbors. Masquerading 
and Sybil attacks are detected on the spot, owing to a generic 
property of suitable MAC protocols: X of rank x can only send 
a longitudinal (resp., lateral) N2N message at a specific UTC 
time Lgx (resp., Ltx). A receiver can thus trivially tell whether X 
tries to impersonate another member (radio channel accessed at 
times other than Lgx or Ltx, or rank other than x). The same 
goes for injections of false messages. 
D. Distant Cyberthreats and Cyber-Stealth Mode 
They can be launched via V2X communications. Given that 
a NSC subsystem has no access to a SCR subsystem and that 
motions of a vehicle are under the exclusive control of a SCR 
subsystem, distant cyberattacks cannot compromise safety. 
Recall that SC-TPDs are immune to distant cyberattacks (no 
new pseudos need be imported). Conversely, cybersecurity is 
not guaranteed for NSC subsystems. Distant cyberattacks on 
input ports may disrupt convenient services (e.g., infotainment, 
traffic data), a tolerable nuisance. Distant eavesdroppers may 
exploit outgoing V2X messages. Personal data secrecy/privacy 
(message contents) can be achieved through encryption. Other 
privacy threats are linked with metadata. Tracking is feasible 
despite frequent pseudo changes, and facilitated with probes 
issued by commodity-grade wifi handlers. We introduce the 
cyber-stealth mode option for NSC subsystems of privately 
owned vehicles: muteness is enforced (no V2X outputs, to the 
exception of e-Call and pseudonymized crowdsourcing—see 
further). This option which guarantees passengers privacy is in 
line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation entered in 
force in Europe in May 2018 [22]. SC V2V messages serve to 
avoid accidents. Thus, medium-range V2V/X2V emergency 
messages broadcast for announcing an accident (recognition of 
a defeat) are not SC messages. Such messages may not be 
necessary since recent radars and cameras have ranges 
comparable to WAVE ranges. The broadcasting of V2X 
messages is useful for updating global traffic data. Estimates 
suffice for planning and traffic management purposes. A 
  
variation of periodic beaconing akin to crowdsourcing may be 
of interest. Every member of a cohort (Γ) runs an algorithm A 
serving to tell whether it must broadcast a V2X message 
carrying Γ’s length (common knowledge within Γ) and its 
GNSS coordinates. A pseudo found in its NSC-TPD is used to 
sign such a message. Receivers learn about the existence of a 
cohort, its spanning and approximate geolocations of non-
identifiable members. Besides preserving privacy, this scheme 
induces light channel loads: 1 (deterministic A) or much less 
than n (probabilistic A) broadcasts at every algorithmic round. 
E. Malicious Behavior, Physical Exclusion, Accountability 
That a CA or a PKI has delivered pseudos to a vehicle X 
does not prohibit X from behaving maliciously, in the physical 
space, and in cyber space by injecting bogus data, thus causing 
accidents. Revocation of credentials (PKI-based solutions) 
achieves eviction in cyber space, which does not suffice. A 
malicious vehicle must be physically excluded from an AVN. 
To this end, SC-TPDs contain predicates, such as: 
- Any 2 consecutive activations of LgSend or LtSend shall 
be separated at least by (latency derived from a MAC protocol) 
- Member ranked rth may activate LgSend (resp., LtSend) at 
UTC times Lgx (resp., Ltx) only 
- SCR subsystem sensors detect a new neighbor in a Cell 
and N2N communications are active. 
Violation of a predicate, UTC timestamped, is recorded in 
SC-TPD, and leads to a Stop. The SCR subsystem, informed 
by the SCC subsystem, takes control: red flashing warning 
lights are turned on, velocity is reduced, until a safe halt is 
possible (parking spot or emergency lane). A pseudonymized 
and encrypted V2X message is broadcast, aimed at appropriate 
public/private organizations (e.g., police, highway authorities, 
insurance companies). That message carries the GNSS location 
of where to find the vehicle, its reversible certificate, and other 
data recorded in SC-TPD. Accountability is guaranteed. 
F. Societal Issues 
With WAVE 1.0 solutions, safety can be compromised by 
cyberattacks, and cyber-surveillance remains an issue. Fees are 
charged for telecommunications and PKI services. WAVE 2.0 
solutions—those briefly exposed here or found in recent 
publications, and under study—achieve highest safety and 
immunity to cyberattacks. Full privacy is enabled with the 
cyber-stealth mode option. Modest fees are due for V2X 
telecommunications, and there is no billing for N2N or SC 
V2V communications or PKI services. The crucial question is: 
In which type of motorized society do we want to live, 
subject to or free from cyber-surveillance? 
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